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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES ARE LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES
Jordan J. Paust*
I. THE FOUNDERS AND PREDOMINANT TRENDS
The Founders clearly expected that the customary law of nations was
binding, was supreme law, created (among others) private rights and du-
ties, and would be applicable in United States federal courts.' For
example, at the time of the formation of the Constitution John Jay had
written: "Under the national government ... the laws of nations, will
always be expounded in one sense ... [and there is] wisdom ... in
committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts ap-
pointed by and responsible only to one national government.. ,. In
1792, the supremacy of the customary law of nations within the United
States was affirmed in Ross v. Rittenhouse;' and Attorney General Ran-
dolph declared: "The law of nations, although not specially adopted ...
is essentially a part of the law of the land."4
* Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston Law Center.
1. For early views, including those of Bee, Bradford (Att'y Gen.), Chase, Duponceau,
Hamilton, Ingersoll, Iredell, Jay, Jefferson, Lee (Att'y Gen.), Madison, Marshall, Mason,
Nicholas, Paterson, Randolph (Att'y Gen.), Story, B. Washington, Wilson, and Wirt (Att'y
Gen.), see, for example, JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW As LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 6, 8, 15-17, 34-36, 40-44, 47-50, 121, 144, 154-55, 182-83, 201, 205, 264-70 &
228-30 (1996). See also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTI-
TUTION 234, 510 n.20 (2 ed. 1996) ("Framers expected federal courts to enforce state
observance of the law of nations."); Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the
Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 35-38, 43-46, 48-49 & 55-56 (1952); Ryan
Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Fed-
eral Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 464-65 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1925, 1841, 1846 & 1852
(1998); G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International Law: The Piracy Cases, 83
Am. J. INT'L L. 727, 727 (1989) ("The Framers' Constitution anticipated that international
disputes would regularly come before the United States courts, and that the decisions in those
cases could rest on principles of international law, without any necessary reference to the com-
mon law or to constitutional doctrines."); see infra notes 30-31, 34.
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 62 (John Jay) (J.C. Hamilton ed. 1868).
3. Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 160, 162 (Pa. 1792) ("[Tihe law of nations ... is
enforced by... the municipal law.., which... may... facilitate or improve the execution of
its decisions. . . ,provided the great universal law remains unaltered."). See PAUST, supra note
1, at 42-43 n.47, 121.
4. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792); see also 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797) (Lee, Att'y
Gen.) ("[T]he law of nations in its fullest extent... [is] part of the law of the land."). Con-
cerning other cases, opinions, and recognitions that customary international law is "law of the
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In 1793, then Chief Justice Jay recognized that "the laws of the
United States," the same phrase found in Article III, section 2, clause 1
and in Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution, includes the customary
"law of nations" and that such law was directly incorporable for the pur-
pose of criminal sanctions.5 Also in 1793, the Chief Justice stated that
prior to the Constitution:
[T]he United States had... become amenable to the laws of na-
tions; and it was their interest as well as their duty to provide,
that those laws should be respected and obeyed; in their national
character and capacity, the United States were responsible to for-
eign nations for the conduct of each state, relative to the laws of
nations, and the performance of treaties; and there the inexpedi-
ency of referring all such questions to State Courts, and
particularly to the Courts of delinquent States, became appar-
ent .... These were among the evils which it was proper for the
nation... to provide by a national judiciary.6
That same year it was affirmed that the "law of nations is part of the
law of the United States."7 Justice Wilson also declared that the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction in certain cases addressing such law, but
that Congress can nevertheless provide a concurrent jurisdiction in lower
federal courts.8 Chief Justice Jay had also charged a grand jury in Vir-
ginia that year in markedly familiar words: "The Constitution, the
statutes of Congress, the law of nations, and treaties constitutionally
land." See, e.g., The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422-23 (1815) (finding that the United
States courts are "bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law of the land"), cited in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980); PAUST, supra note 1, at 34, 36, 40-42
& 47-48, passim; see infra note 10.
5. Henfield's Case, 11 Cas. 1099, 1101 (C.C.D.Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360); see also id. at
1103-04, 1112 & 1115; PAUST, supra note 1, at 6-8, 34-48, passim. For other cases, opinions,
and recognitions that customary international law is "law of the United States," see, for exam-
ple, PAUST, supra note 1, at 40; Dickinson, supra note 1, at 46, 48 & 56 (stating that "a
constituent part of the national law of the United States" is that "the Constitution accepted the
Law of Nations as national law .... ) and Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the
United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1566 (1984); see infra notes 7, 9, 21 & 24. Today, it is
not widely assumed that customary international law is directly incorporable for purposes of
criminal sanctions. See PAUST, supra note 1, at 7, 44-45.
6. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) (Jay, C.J.). The Chief Justice
added that federal judicial power extends to "all cases affecting Ambassadors, or other public
Ministers and Consuls; because, as these are officers of foreign nations, whom this nation are
bound to protect and treat according to the laws of nations, cases affecting them ought only to
be cognizable by national authority" and to all cases of admiralty "because, as the seas are the
joint property of nations, whose rights and privileges relative thereto, are regulated by the law
of nations and treaties, such cases necessarily belong to national jurisdiction." Id. at 475; see
Koh, supra note 1, at 1825, 1828, 1841 & 1846.
7. United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 299 n.* (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
8. Id. at 298 (Wilson, J.).
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made compose the laws of the United States." 9 In that year also, Secre-
tary of State Thomas Jefferson reassured the French Minister Genet that
the law of nations is an "integral part" of the law of the land,'0 and in his
home state of Virginia it was declared in Page v. Pendleton": "[T]he
legislature ... admitted, that the law and usages of nations require ...
that the legislature could not retract their consent to observe the precepts
of the law, and conform to the usages, of nations. ,, " In 1795, Justice
Iredell addressed direct incorporation of customary international law and
affirmed the fact of incorporation with or without a statutory base in a
consistent and telling fashion: "This is so palpable a violation of our own
law ... of which the law of nations is a part, as it subsisted either before
the act of Congress on the subject, or since. . . ."" With respect to the
broad range of matters subject to incorporation, he added: "[A]ll... tres-
passes committed against the general law of nations, are
enquirable... . "" An early case had also expressly related the duty to
incorporate customary international law to the Constitution: "[C]ourts...
[i]n this country ... are bound, by the Constitution of the United States,
to determine according to treaties and the law of nations, wherever they
apply."'
15
Similar recognitions had occurred previously and would occur
throughout our history. 6 For example, in 1895, Hilton v. Guyot 7 reaf-
firmed early decisions and expectations when declaring:
International law in its widest and most comprehensive sense...
is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice, as often as such questions are presented in
litigation between man and man, duly submitted to their deter-
mination."
9. PAUST, supra note 1, at 40 n.44 (quoting from Charge to the Grand Jury for the Dis-
trict of Virginia, May 22, 1793).
10. See id. at 42 n.45 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to French Minister Genet of
June 5, 1793).
11. 1 Va. Rep. (Wythe) 221 (Ch. 1793).
12. Id.
13. Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159-61 (1795) (Iredell, J.); see also I Op. Att'y
Gen. 566, 570-71 (1822) (ruling that the law of nations is part of "the laws of the country" and
"our laws"). For other cases using the phrase "our law," see, for example, PAUST, supra note 1,
at 7, and infra note 18 and accompanying text.
14. Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. at 159-60.
15. Waite v. The Antelope, 28 F. Cas. 1341 (D.C.D.S. Car. 1807); see also supra note 5;
infra notes 22, 31 & 48 and accompanying text. Concerning judicial recognition of the duty to
identify, clarify, and apply customary international law, see, for example, PAUST, supra note 1,
at 7-8, 47-48.
16. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 6-7, 34-48.
17. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
18. Id. at 163.
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Nearly fifty years later, the Supreme Court summarized its practice
in ascertaining and applying what is a portion of customary international
law, the law of war, with or without a statutory base, 9 in the following
words:
From the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized
and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of
nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status,
rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individu-
als.20
Quite appropriately, the most recent Restatement of the Foreign Re-
lations Law of the United States recognizes: "Matters arising under
customary international law also arise under 'the laws of the United
States,' since international law is 'part of our law' .. . and is federal
law."2' Thus, the Restatement rightly adds, cases "arising under custom-
ary international law" are "within the Judicial Power of the United States
under Article IlI, section 2 of the Constitution; '2  and such law, "while
not mentioned explicitly in the Supremacy clause," is supreme federal
law within the meaning of Article VI, clause 2.23 For these reasons, the
phrase "laws ... of the United States" contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331
gives the district courts original jurisdiction over all civil cases arising
under customary international law and provides a general statutory base
for judicial incorporation of customary international law. 4 As docu-
mented in my treatise:
19. The direct statutory base for application of criminal sanctions for violations of the laws
of war did not exist until the 1916 Articles of War, Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat.
650, 652-53, arts. 12 & 15, were addressed in the Court's opinion in Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1, 27-28 (1942). Nonetheless, the laws of war had been applied throughout our history. See,
e.g., Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL.
L. REV. 99, 112-18, passim (1972), in JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ET AL., IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 242-47 (1996).
20. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942).
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1l, reporters' note 4 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; see also id. cmt. e; id. § 702 cmt.
c; PAUST, supra note 1, at 40-41 n.44, 41-42 n.45, passim; see supra notes 1, 4-5, 7, 9-10, 13
& 18.
22. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 111 cmt. e; see also id. reporters' note 4, § 702 cmt.
c; PAUST, supra note I, at 42 n.46, passim; see supra notes 2, 6, 8, 14-15, 18 & 20; see infra
notes 31, 48.
23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 11 cmt. d; see also id. reporters' note 2, §§ 115 cmt.
e & 702 cmt. c; HENKIN, supra note 1, at 157; PAUST, supra note 1, at 6-7, 42-43 n.47 &pas-
sim; Koh, supra note 1, at 1835 n.59; see supra notes 1, 11.
24. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 111 cmt. e & reporters' note 4; PAUST, supra
note 1, at 6-7, 43 n.48; Henkin, supra note 5, at 1561; Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions
and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN. L. REV. 349, 351 (1988); see also Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 887 n.22 ("We recognize that our reasoning might also sustain jurisdic-
tion under the general federal question provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331."); cf. Kadic v. Karadzic,
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[C]ustomary international law that provides rights or remedies,
as law of the United States, is federal substantive law and federal
courts have subject matter jurisdiction with respect to such law.
Further, customary international law is federal law and supreme
law of the land whether or not other more technical jurisdictional
competencies also pertain (such as diversity or admiralty juris-
diction).
For these reasons also, customary international law has been di-
rectly incorporable, at least for civil sanction and jurisdictional
purposes, without the need for some other statutory base....
Since international law is law of the United States in several
senses noted above, the judiciary also has the power to take judi-
cial notice of and, thus, to identify and clarify customary
international law. More importantly, such attributes of interna-
tional law and judicial power compel recognition [as evidenced
in numerous cases throughout our history] that the judiciary is
bound to identify, clarify and apply customary international law
in cases or controversies properly before the courts.25
70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (not deciding whether § 1331 "provides an independent basis
for subject matter jurisdiction over all claims alleging violations of international law," but not-
ing that several courts have "upheld section 1331 jurisdiction for international law violations"),
citing Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, No. 90-2010 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 1993), affid on other grounds,
72 F.3d 844 (11 th Cir. 1996); Martinez-Baca v. Suarez-Mason, No. 87-2057, slip op. at 4-5
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 1988); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
From the time of the Founders, Congress has known and expected that the federal judiciary
will identify, clarify, and apply customary international law in cases otherwise properly before
the courts. Such long-term expectations and continued congressional acceptance of judicial
power are highly relevant to interpretation of phrases like "laws of the United States" in con-
gressional legislation concerning jurisdictional competence of lower federal courts. They also
help to identify an implied will of Congress or continued congressional acceptance relevant to
allocated powers concerning international law, especially when Congress has known that the
federal judiciary applies customary international law, and Congress has never enacted legisla-
tion to restrict such judicial power. See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 677-80
(1981) (stating that Congress similarly can impliedly delegate or accept allocation of power to
the Executive: "Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive
agreement .... Over the years, Congress... [demonstrated] Congress' continuing accep-
tance .... Just as important, Congress has not disapproved of the action taken here."); Michael
J. Glennon, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1542, 1552-53 (1997) (book review) (explaining that in City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1981), Chief Justice Rehnquist offered a theory
of an implied congressional delegation to the federal courts of an authority to make common
law-a theory that is useful by analogy concerning competence to apply customary interna-
tional law even though customary international law is not mere common law).
25. PAUST, supra note I, at 7, 44 n.50 & 46-48 nn.53-57.
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II. THE BRADLEY-GOLDSMITH ERRORS AND FALLACIES
It is astonishing, therefore, to read a co-authored claim that the over-
whelming patterns of expectation that customary international law is law
of the United States, part of our law, and federal law is merely a "modern
position" developed in the last twenty years. 6 Equally bizarre and unreal
is the notion that customary international law was not incorporated by the
federal judiciary for federal decision-making or, as Professors Curtis
Bradley and Jack Goldsmith claim, that "[t]hroughout most of this na-
tion's history, CIL [customary international law] did not have the status
of federal law ... [and] lacked the supremacy, jurisdictional, and other
consequences of federal law.,
27
Contrary to their ahistorical assertions, actual patterns of use of cus-
tomary international law throughout our history demonstrate that what
they term the "modem position" was generally endorsed long ago and
has been evidenced fairly consistently in the continuous use of customary
international law both directly and indirectly by federal courts for more
than 200 years.2 More specifically with respect to their concern about
26. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 816, 816-17 (1997)
[hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith]; see also id. at 834, 837 & 868; but see id. at 822-23
(admitting: "[t]hroughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, federal courts applied
CIL in a variety of contexts... usually in the absence of statutory ... authorization... [and
also] as part of 'our law' or the 'law of the land'...."), 834 n.125, 850-51 & nn.223, 229-
230. They basically reiterate general points in other articles. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 319 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith II]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260, 2264,
2273 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith III]. Many of the points in this section are ex-
panded upon from Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law in the United States: Clean
and Dirty Laundry, 40 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 78, 92-99 (1997).
27. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 820-21, 823-25, 834 n.125 & 851;
Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 335; Bradley & Goldsmith III, supra note 26, at
2262, 2264-65; Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 492 n.66 & 493 n.77
(1998) [hereinafter Bradley, Charming Betsy]; Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Consti-
tution and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 543, 545-546 & 554 (1999)
[hereinafter Bradley, Breard]. But see infra notes 49-52, 54-60; Glennon, supra note 24;
Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 469 (" 'revisionist' ... radically new"); Koh, supra note 1,
at 1827, 1835 n.59, 1841, 1846 & 1851; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Nationalizing International
Law: Essay in Honor of Louis Henkin, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.121, 126 n. 23 (1997)
(maintaining that Bradley and Goldsmith's arguments are "wholly unpersuasive" and advocate
"a position that makes no sense from an international perspective"); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense
and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 371 (1997) ("much of what they add is seriously in
error"); see id. at 388-89, 391.
28. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 1, 5-50, 95, 174-75, 179, 186, 192-95, 201-02,
221-22 nn.92-93, 248, 264-70, 338-45 & 371; see also Glennon, supra note 24, at 1552
("hardly modem"); Koh, supra note 1, at 1827, 1841, 1846 & 1852. Unavoidably, a "mistaken
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human rights,29 such rights were of fundamental importance to the Foun-
ders and there has been significant attention to a rich and wide array of
human rights ever since the formation of the United States.3 ° In fact,
Chief Justice Marshall recognized in 1810 that our judicial tribunals "are
established ... to decide on human rights."'" Federal courts had been
using human right precepts prior to Chief Justice Marshall's affirmation
of judicial authority and responsibility, and have done so ever since.32
Further, what Professors Bradley and Goldsmith consider to be "new"
law regulating "a state's treatment of its own citizens,"33 including
historical analysis" of which Professors Bradley and Goldsmith complain, see Bradley & Gold-
smith, supra note 26, at 874, is not that of the Second Circuit in Filartiga, but their own. When
faced with the argument that customary international law "forms part of the laws of the United
States only to the extent that Congress has acted to define it," the Second Circuit rightly re-
sponded, "[t]his extravagant claim is amply refuted by the numerous decisions applying rules of
international law uncodified in any act of Congress." Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 886; see also id. at
887 & n.20 ("international law has an existence in the federal courts independent of acts of
Congress .... ).
29. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 831 & n.106, 832 & 841; Bradley &
Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 330, 335, 359 & 364; Bradley & Goldsmith IH, supra note 26,
at 2261; Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV.
390, 451 (1998) (assuming incorrectly that human rights or rights of man would not have been
a proper subject for early treaties); id. 452 & n.353 (assuming incorrectly that in early U.S.
history international and domestic law were "distinct"). An ahistorical bias against human
rights is evident in an essay of Professor Lawrence Lessig that addresses portions of the Brad-
ley & Goldsmith argument. See Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on
Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1796-97 (1997). Professor Lessig
assumes incorrectly (or was misled) that customary human rights law is "new" and is divorced
from or based less on other forms of customary international law than on patterns of expecta-
tion and practice. See id. He also assumes incorrectly: (1) that "consent" (especially of "states")
was a primary "source" of customary international law, and (2) that "consent" is now "less"
relevant, especially with respect to human rights. See id.; see infra note 67. Professor Lessig
may also be unaware of the fact that the judiciary has used scholarly writings (among other
indicia) to evidence the content of international law since the dawn of the United States and
that such is not unique with respect to customary human rights. Compare Lessig, supra at 1797
("more the articulation of academics"), with PAUST, supra note 1, at 3, 19-20; Koh, supra note
1, at 1858 & n.190.
30. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 8, 169-203, 214-72, 323-25 & 329 (quoting Tho-
mas Paine, who wrote that the "end of all political association is the preservation of the ...
rights of man"), passim; United States v. Haun, 26 F. Cas. 227, 230-32 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860)
(No. 15, 329) (stating that Jefferson was concerned about "violations of human rights" by the
citizens of the United States and, thus, private duties regarding inhabitants of Africa).
31. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810).
32. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 182-98, 228-56.
33. Bradley & Goldsmith lI, supra note 26, at 2261, 2264; Bradley, Charming Betsy, su-
pra note 27, at 511, 513; Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S.
Courts-Before and after Erie, 26 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at
23, on file with author) [hereinafter Bradley, Status of Customary International Law]; see also
Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 327, 335 & 359 & n.221; Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 26, at 828 ("[C]IL was not yet viewed as regulating the relations between a nation
and its citizens"); cf id. at 831 & n.106 ("primarily governed only interstate relations... 'it
was thought to be antithetical ... '), 839 ("primarily"); see infra note 70.
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customary legal rights of individuals against states, especially human
rights, is not new. Indeed, it is partly what our nation and much of the
Bill of Rights, especially the Ninth Amendment, were founded upon.
Moreover, one should not confuse the supposed lack of direct remedies
of individuals at the international level prior to World War H with a lack
of individual rights under international law and various remedies in do-
mestic legal processes. 35 Although rare, such remedies at the international
level had been recognized.36
Much of Professor Bradley and Goldsmith's reasoning rests on an er-
roneous premise that customary international law was and is merely
"general common law., 37 Because customary international law is not
mere "common law" but part of the "law of the land" and "laws of the
United States" within constitutionally-based judicial authority and re-
sponsibility,38 their nearly obsessive focus on Erie R.R. Co. v.
Thompkins,39 and Swift v. Tyson, 0 neither of which addresses interna-
tional law or has had any demonstrated impact on actual patterns of
federal court use of customary international law, is significantly flawed
and misleading. Additionally, use of what are merely "common law,"
"law merchant," or "maritime" and "admiralty" cases and arguments of
34. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at passim. Early patterns of expectation concerning
various types of human rights included especially civil and political rights against one's own
government, state or federal. Id. Yet, there were many others. See, e.g., id.
35. This type of error also exists in their treatment of customary international law con-
cerning the "denial of justice" to an alien. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at
831 n.106, with RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 711; PAUST, supra note 1, at 259-61, 290.
36. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 290-91, 274-75.
37. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 820, 823-24, 827, 844 & 849; Bradley &
Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 323 (falsely stating that 19th and 20th century cases applying
CIL did so as "'general common law' "); id. at 324, 326, 331-32 & 334-35; Bradley & Gold-
smith I, supra note 26, at 2262; Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 485, 493-94 &
523; Bradley, Breard, supra note 27, at 543 ("courts applied ... only as a form of 'general
common law .... ). This sort of error continues to mislead others. See, e.g., Neuman, supra
note 27, at 374, 381-82; Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law
as Federal Law after Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 393, 408-10, 412-13, 425 & 433 (1997).
38. PAUST, supra note 1, at 5-8, 30-50 & 176; see supra notes 1-2, 4-10 & 13-15; see
also Henkin, supra note 5, at 1561-62, 1564-65; Koh, supra note 1, at 1835 n.59; White, su-
pra note 1; but see Koh, supra note 1, at 1835 n.61. With respect to United States v. Smith (18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820)), in particular, compare PAUST, supra note 1, at 31 n.34, 140
n.96, with Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 488 n.46. Further, customary interna-
tional law is of a higher status than mere common law and, in case of a clash, should trump
mere common law. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 5-8, 30 n.34, 36 n.39, 42-43 n.47, 92 &
120-22 n.55; cases cited infra note 52.
39. Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
40. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (14 Pet.) 1 (1842). Professor Bradley misstates the case,
which made no mention of international law, when he argues that Swift is an example of a court
treating customary international law "as part of the 'general common law.'" Bradley, Charm-
ing Betsy, supra note 27, at 493 & n.75.
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others who rely on such cases are seriously misplaced. 4' For example,
Bradlely and Goldsmith reference United States v. Hudson & Good-
win, 2 a case that addresses mere "common law" and makes no
mention of the law of nations or international law.4 '3 Further, Bradley
and Goldsmith's references to cases and opinions using the phrases
"laws of the United States," "law of the land," and "our law," are in-
complete and potentially misleading."
Their disfavored theory requires that "all law applied by federal
courts ... be either federal law or state law' 45 and recognition that "if
CIL [customary international law] is not federal law, then there is no
basis for the federal judiciary to enforce CIL. ... 46 If so, the ines-
capable fact of continued use of customary international law in the
41. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 822, 824, 850 n.222, 851 & nn.230-
31, 852-56 & 859, and Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 324 n.28, with PAUST, supra
note 1, at 30-33. Concerning mere "maritime" law, which was not customary international law,
see PAUST, id. at 33 n.34, and compare Koh, supra note 1, at 1830-32, 1835 & nn.59, 61.
42. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-33 (1812).
43. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 851 & n.231 (and other cases cited
therein), with PAUST, supra note 1, at 32-33, 44-45 (noting that despite the Supreme Court's
prohibition of "common law" crimes as such, subsequent cases did not invalidate indictments
based on direct incorporation of the law of nations for criminal sanction purposes); PAUST,
BASSlOUNI, ET AL., supra note 19, at 210-12; U.S. DEP'T OF ARMy FIELD MANUAL FM 27-10,
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE .505 (e) (1956) ("As the international law of war is part of the
law of the land in the United States, enemy personnel charged with war crimes are tried directly
under international law without recourse to the statutes of the United States."); and Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942). After Hudson & Goodwin, in United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 153, 159 (1820), it was not thought that Congress must definitely implement cus-
tomary international criminal law by legislation. The Smith Court stated: "But supposing
Congress were bound in all cases ... to define," id. at 159, thus implying that Congress may
not have to define such offenses. Bradley and Goldsmith mislead readers when stating that the
rejection of "common law" crimes cases occurred "even in cases involving violations of the
law of nations." Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 333. There are no such cases after
Hudson & Goodwin. As noted here, on the contrary, there are cases involving direct incorpora-
tion of customary international law for criminal sanction purposes.
44. For an examination of the use of these phrases, and why Bradley and Goldsmith's ref-
erences to these phrases are incomplete, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 823,
834 n.125 & 850-51, and Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 332 n.69 (providing in-
complete quotes of Chief Justice Jay and Attorney General Randolph), with PAUST, supra note
1, at 6-7, 34-36, 40-43 & 47; supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text. More recently, one
finds the erroneous claim that all "part of our law" cases "simply demonstrate that" customary
international law "was treated as part of... general common law." Bradley, Breard, supra note
27, at 545.
45. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 852.
46. Id. at 846; Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 523. See Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 26, at 847; see also Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 526 (arguing that
courts should abandon judicial power and responsibility under the Constitution and allow Con-
gress and the President to violate international law). Nonetheless, they admit that often in our
history "federal courts applied CIL in a variety of contexts... usually in the absence of statu-
tory... authorization... [and also] as part of 'our law' or 'the law of the land.'" Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 822-23; see also id. at 834 n. 125, 850-51 & nn.223, 229-230.
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federal courts and overwhelming patterns of supportive expectation,
regardless of customary international law's domesticated name or
classification (which clearly has not been merely "state law"), speak
loudly with respect to the general validity of their theory and its er-
roneous premise. Moreover, this use continued after Erie and its
supposedly relevant reasoning. Additionally, if Erie, which is not on
point, requires that mere "common law" have some sort of authoriza-
tion,47 such a need is met with respect to customary international law
given its constitutional bases in Articles III and VI of the U.S. Con-
stitution as well as in other constitutional provisions and various
federal statutes (also providing subject matter jurisdiction). 8
A thorough inquiry into actual patterns of legal expectation
documented in numerous federal court opinions demonstrates that
customary international law has long been incorporated by the federal
judiciary for federal decision-making and that the sweeping claim of
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith that customary international law
49lacked supremacy consequences, lacked jurisdictional conse-
47. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 852 & n.243 (appropriate if merely
"'governed by the Federal Constitution' "); id. 855-56 & n.263.
48. See PAUST, supra note 1, at 5-8, 30-50, 95, 174-75, 186, 192-94, 222, 246-48, 338-
40 & passim; Dickinson, supra note 1, at 48 ("the Constitution accepted the Law of Nations as
national law .... ); see supra notes 5-6, 15, 22 & 24; but see Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra
note 26, at 345; Bradley, Status of Customary International Law, supra note 33, at 20-21
nn.80-87 and accompanying text. Specifically, customary international law has various bases
in the Constitution as well as in Acts of Congress (either of which should satisfy the language
found in Erie). The more general statutory base is 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See supra note 24. The
fact that customary international law has several constitutional bases for incorporation does not
mean, however, that all customary international law or even all customary rights (or even all
customary human rights) are constitutional rights in the normal sense of the phrase. The Bill of
Rights provide a constitutional basis for many customary human rights, and the Ninth Amend-
ment was meant to protect customary human rights for "the people." But, given the
interpretation of the phrase "the people" in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990), it does not appear that the Ninth Amendment reaches all customary human rights for all
persons. Nonetheless, the Fifth, Fourteenth, and various other amendments also provide protec-
tion with respect to some human rights for aliens. See, e.g., United States .v. Toscanino, 500
F.2d 267, 276-80 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 916-18 (D.D.C.
1988); United States v. Tiede, Crim. Case No. 78-OOIA (U.S. Ct. for Berlin Mar. 14, 1979), 85
F.R.D. 227 (1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 179 (1980).
49. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 821, 824-25 & 851, Bradley &
Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 323-24, 335, Bradley & Goldsmith m, supra note 26, at 2262,
2265-66, Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 493 n.77, Bradley, Breard, supra note
27, at 543 (erroneous statement: "did not preempt state law"), id. at 554 (making outrageous,
ahistorical statement that supremacy of CIL "has essentially no support in American case law"
and "the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue"-concerning merely Supreme Court
cases, see, e.g., infra note 52, and PAUST, supra note 1, at 15, 42-43, n.47, 44 n.50, 131 n.79 &
186-187), with PAUST, supra note 1, at 6-7, 15-16, 36 & 42-44 (universally binding, all tribu-
nals), id. at 92, 97 & 121-22 (noting that the view of the Continental Congress had been similar
to Philip Jessup's policy argument mentioned in Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 859),
id. at 131, 134, 139-40, 179, 182-83, 187, 193, 229, 248 n.391, 333-34 & 352, RESTATE-
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quences, ° and lacked "other consequences of federal law"'" is erroneous.
Further, if general common law lacked such consequences and did not
bind the states, use of the law of nations by state courts at various times
in our history, often with recognition that such law is binding, and related
recognitions by the federal judiciary also stand in opposition to claims that
customary international law was mere common law and was not consid-
ered binding. 2 Similarly, if "general common law" was not considered part
MENT, supra note 21, §§ Il1 cmt. d & 115 cmt. e, Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
POLITICS AND VALUES 69 (1995), Henkin, supra note 5, Koh, supra note 1, at 1835 n.59, 1846
& 1851, and infra note 52. The view that customary international law is not binding law in the
United States is actually without support in the views of the Founders, the text and structure of
the Constitution, or federal judicial opinions. From a policy perspective, it would thwart the
fundamental purposes of the supremacy clause, and it would disturb foreign relations. See also
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 424-25 (1964); MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW 211
(1997). Concerning the ambiguous language "in Pursuance thereof' in Article VI of the Con-
stitution, compare Bradley, Status of Customary International Law supra note 33, at 21, and
Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 321 n.12 ("pursuant to U.S. constitutional proc-
esses"), with PAUST, supra note 1, at 43, as is stated:
Article VI... might require (1) that customary international law be "made" (as it is
in part) by U.S. participation in pursuance of constitutional authority or powers, or
(2) that customary law, to be supreme federal law, must be in conformity with (i.e.,
in pursuance of) the Constitution. Certainly such a phrase does not require
"enactment."
50. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 821, Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra
note 26, at 324, 335, and Bradley & Goldsmith III, supra note 26, at 2262, with PAUST, supra
note 1, at 8, 34 & nn.37-38, 42 & nn. 46-47, 45-46, 201-02 & 264-70 & nn.497-512, Hudson
v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293, 294 (1808), Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187
(1804) (counsel), and United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 121, 129-32 (1795).
51. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 820-21, Bradley & Goldsmith II,
supra note 26, at 324, 335, Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 493 n.77, Bradley,
Breard, supra note 27, at 543 ("U.S. courts in the nineteenth century did not treat customary
international law as federal law"), and id. at 546, with PAUST, supra note 1, at 5-8, 29-50,
143-46, 154-60, 201-02 & 264-70 & nn.497-512.
52. See supra notes 3 & 49. For additional recognition that states are bound by the law of
nations, see, for example, Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1941) ("International
law.., is the law of all States of the Union."); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240,
264 (1891) (states are bound by law of nations in defining their boundaries); Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 560 (1857) (McLean, J., dissenting) ("our States... are
independent.... subject only to international laws.. * ."); Murray v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.,
62 F. 24, 42 (N.D. Iowa 1894) ("no more subject to abrogation or modification by state legisla-
tion than are the principles of the law of nations .... ); United States ex rel. Wheeler v.
Williamson, 28 F. Cas. 686, 692 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 16,726) (each state "is bound
by .... because of its universal obligation .... the 'law of nations.' What it could not do if
freed from federative restrictions, it cannot do new; every restraint upon its policy... binds it
still .... ); Thompson v. Doaksum, 68 Cal. 593, 596, 10 P. 199, 201 (1886) (the obligation to
protect private rights under the law of nations "passed to the new government"); Teschemacher
v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 11, 22-23 (1861) (inviolability of property rights exists under the law of
nations); Riddell v. Fuhrman, 233 Mass. 69, 73, 123 N.E. 237, 239 (1919) ("'International law
is a part of our law' and must be administered whenever involved in causes presented for de-
termination."); Territory ex rel. Wade v. Ashenfelter, 4 N.M. 93, 148, 12 P. 879 (1887) (New
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Mexico judicial duty is "to maintain only those principles of law... proper for the protection
of human rights...."); People v. Liebowitz, 140 Misc.2d 820, 822, 531 N.Y.S.2d 719, 721
(1988) ("Even in the absence of a treaty, it is a court's obligation to enforce recognized princi-
ples of international law where questions of right depending on such principles are presented
for the court's determination."); Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 25 N.Y.2d 252,
259, 250 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Ct. of App. N.Y. 1969) (action "in this case is mandated by the
rules of international law. It is settled that... all domestic courts must give effect to customary
international law."); De Simone v. Transportes Maritimos do Estado, 200 A.D. 82, 89 (S.Ct.
N.Y., App. Div., 1st Dep't. 1922) ("... the court has no jurisdiction and could not disregard
the protest and overrule the objection by a claim... [under] the municipal law of this State ... ,
for by the law of nations an adjudication.. could not be made .... ); and Stanley v. Ohio, 24
Ohio St. 166, 174 (1873) (state has concern "to discharge such duties as are imposed upon it by
the law of nations").
[T]he rule is firmly established and uniformly recognized that "International law is
part of our law and as such is the law of all States of the Union .... The rule has
been briefly stated as follows: ... the law of nations is to be treated as part of the
law of the land. The courts of all nations judicially notice this law, and it must be as-
certained and administered by the courts of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination ......
30 Am. Jur., International Law, p. 178 § 7.... In essence, the rule appears to be that
international law is part of the law of every state which is enforced by its courts
without any constitutional or statutory act of incorporation by reference, and...
relevant provisions of the law of nations are legally paramount whenever interna-
tional rights and duties are involved before a court having jurisdiction to enforce
them.
Peters v. McKay, 195 Or. 412, 424, 426, 238 P.2d 225, 230-31 (S.Ct. Ore. 1951). In addition,
see, for example, Banks v. Greenleaf, 10 Va. 271, 277 (1799) ("Admiralty causes bind all the
world; because decided, upon the laws of nations ... ."); State v. Pang, 132 Wash.2d 852, 908,
940 P.2d 1293, 1322 (1997) ("International law is incorporated into our domestic law.");
Woodworth v. Fulton, 1 Cal. 295, 306 (1850) ("the law of nations .... as it is a part of the
laws of all civilized countries, forms also a branch of American jurisprudence."); and People ex
rel. Attorney-General v. Naglee, I Cal. 232, 234 (1850) (state has "power to do a given act,
which, without a transgression of international law, falls within the scope of powers of any
independent nation," unless transferred to federal government).
However inclined courts may be to follow the interpretation of such statutes by the
courts of the State which has enacted the statute, their interpretation is not conclu-
sive, and ... the Supreme Court distinctly lays down the rule that the question of
international law as to whether the action is to enforce a penalty or not "must be de-
termined by the court, State or National, in which the suit is brought." The test is not
by what name the statute is called by the Legislature or by the courts of the State in
which it was passed....
Maryland v. Turner, 75 Misc. 9, 11, 132 N.Y.S. 173, 174 (1911); see also Lehman v. McBride,
15 Ohio St. 573, 607 (1863) (in face of argument that state legislation violates international law
and is therefore void, state legislation was construed so as not to be extraterritorial in violation
of international law); Ex parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77, 189 (1859) ("The constitution of the
United States was framed, and the union perfected, subordinate to, and without violating the
fundamental laws of nations .... ); McArthur v. Kelly, 5 Ohio 139, 143 (1831) ("The law of
nations require it."); Siplyak v. Davis, 276 Pa. 49, 57, 119 A. 745, 747 (1923) ("'... where the
general law of nations and those of foreign commerce say the contrary ... I very much ques-
tion the power or authority of any state or nation.., to pass such a law ....' (quoting
Robinson v. Wall, 2 Nott & McC. 498, 503-05); Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Warwick, 61 Va.
(20 Gratt) 614, 651-52 (1871) ("can it be maintained that this statute... shall override the
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of the "Laws of the United States," 3 it is telling that customary interna-
tional law certainly was.54 One case that Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith cite, Ker v. Illinois," actually declares that a state court "is
bound to take notice" of the law of nations, "as ... is ... the courts of
the United States. 56 Another case cited, Huntington v. Attrill,57 actually
recognizes that questions of international law involve concurrent duties
since they "must be determined in the first instance by the court, state or
national, in which the suit is brought," and adds both that such questions
can be brought in federal courts and that the federal court "must decide
for itself, uncontrolled by local decisions."58
public and universal law of nations...?... The refutation of such a proposition is found in its
simple statement. It would be a solecism in law and reason .... "); Neuman, supra note 27, at
377. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
Professor Peter Spiro claims that "no federal court has ever nullified a state law as incon-
sistent with customary norms." Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 578 n.40 (1997). In view of predominant expectations since the time of
the Founders, which have apparently shaped the behavior of state legislative bodies, and cases
noted above, such a statement is misleading. When he adds "[n]or have the courts shown any
inclination to trump state laws with customary norms," id. at 578, the error of such a remark is
quite evident in view of general patterns of legal expectation noted in the cases above. Clearly
also, one should not infer that states are not bound by international law. For example, it may be
that no federal case actually holds that state law cannot authorize genocide or other crimes
against humanity within a state's borders. To conclude that state legislators or judges are there-
fore free to authorize such international crimes or to disregard their prohibition under
customary international law would be fallacious. It would be similarly erroneous to proffer that
courts had shown no inclination to trump state laws permitting genocide or crimes against hu-
manity. Indeed, there has been some attention .to the legal relevance and/or primacy of
prohibitions of genocide and other crimes against humanity in state courts. See, for example,
Smith v. Regents of the University of California, 4 Cal4th 843, 884, 844 P.2d 500, 528 (1993)
(Arabian, J., dissenting) (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189-92 (1972)), which recog-
nized that a university may properly deny recognition and funding to activities presenting "an
imminent threat to campus order through the promotion of racial genocide." See also Wilkinson
v. People, 86 Col. 406, 411 (1929) (ruling that state statute did not preclude the wife of the
accused from testifying against the accused who was charged with a "crime committed against
the natural daughter of the wife, and therefore an outrage.., as well as a crime against human-
ity"), quoted in State v. Crow, 104 Ariz. 579, 586; 457 P.2d 256, 263 (1969); O'Loughlin v.
People, 90 Colo. 368, 378, 10 P.2d 543, 546 (1932).
53. See Bradley, Status of Customary International Law, supra note 33, at 8.
54. See PAUST, supra note 1, at 6 & 40.
55. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886), cited in Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note
26, at 824 n.53; Bradley & Goldsmith I, supra note 26, at 324 n.28; Bradley, Breard, supra
note 27, at 543 n.72.
56. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444.
57. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892), cited in Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 26, at 824 n.48; Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 332 n.64.
58. Huntington, 146 U.S. at 683. The Court did not hold that customary international law
was not "federal law." But see Bradley & Goldsmith I1, supra note 26, at 334. Nor did the
Huntington Court completely reject what Bradley and Goldsmith refer to as "the modern posi-
tion" in id. at 335 n.85. See Huntington, 146 U.S. at 683.
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There are simply no known federal cases ruling that states can violate
customary international law, and although, as Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith point out, there are rare cases (late in our history) denying
merely Supreme Court jurisdiction to review state rulings (a denial that is
no longer authoritative), 59 at least two such cases actually reaffirm that
state courts are "bound to take notice" of and are bound "as fully" to ap-
ply customary international law.60 Not one of the cases noted declares
that international law is not part of the law to be applied in lower federal
courts. Indeed, these cases recognize that federal courts have the same
duties as states with respect to cases that originate in federal courts. That
others make broad, historically indefensible statements concerning such
rare and specific rulings and ignore other recognitions even in such cases,
is regrettable but of no authoritative support for even more erroneous
generalities.
With respect to state competence, by necessary implication the very
fact that under the Supremacy Clause state courts are bound to apply in-
ternational law enhances their power to do so. The Restatement notes:
Questions under international law or international agreements of
the United States often arise in State courts. As law of the United
States, international law is also the law of every State, is a basis
59. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 824 n.53 (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436, 444 (1886), and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286-87 (1875)); Brad-
ley & Goldsmith 1I, supra note 26, at 324 n.28, 332 & n.64, 334 n.84; Bradley & Goldsmith
I, supra note 26, at 2262 n.17; Bradley, Status of Customary International Law, supra note
33, at 10-11 (adding Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1924));
see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 111 reporters' note 3. Concerning Ker, see supra note
55 and accompanying text. Concerning New York Life, see PAUST, supra note 1, at 33 & 40. In
my opinion, Justice Bradley, who dissented in New York Life, was correct that customary inter-
national law is "law of the United States" for purposes of Supreme Court review of state
decisions. See New York Life Ins. Co., 92 U.S. at 287-88 (Bradley, J., dissenting); Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 474; Neuman, supra note 27, at 374 n.14. Justice Bradley later
wrote for the majority in cases referring to international law. See PAUST, supra note 1, at 33,
citing Amy v. City of Watertown, 130 U.S. 320, 326 (1888); Coffee v. Grover, 123 U.S. 1, 9
(1887). Justice Bradley was ultimately thoroughly vindicated by the Court in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) ("must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law... rules of international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial
state interpretations."). See RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, §§ Ill reporters' notes 2-3 & 115,
cmt. e.
60. Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1924) (stating that
the question is one of "general law applicable alike" and "as fully" to "suits in state courts as to
those in the courts of the United States" and should be "transferred to the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit"); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (finding that the state
court "is bound to take notice" of the law of nations, "as ... is (sic) ... the courts of the United
States"). Huntington, 146 U.S. at 683, which uses the word "must," is quite consistent. See
supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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for the exercise of judicial authority by State courts, and is cog-
61nizable in cases in State courts....
The Restatement adds: "State courts take judicial notice of federal
law and will therefore take judicial notice of international law as law of
the United States., 62 Earlier in our history, the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky devised a remedy for an act of war by Confederate soldiers in
violation of the law of nations, as that Court noted: "There is nothing in
the Federal Constitution which deprives a State court of power to decide
a question of international law incidentally involved in a case over which
it has jurisdiction . ,6' Today, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) allows removal of
an action from a state to a federal court, but, per terms of the statute, only
if jurisdiction is actually "founded on a claim or right arising under" in-
ternational law. Thus, removal is not required if international law is only
incidentally involved. 64
With respect to the nature of customary international law, Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith state incorrectly that the dissenter view is the
"prevailing view;, 65 that the only participants concerning its formation
and meaning are states;66 that state "consent" is the basis of customary
law; 67 that it does not specify how obligations must be treated within
61. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 111 cmt. d; see also HENKIN, supra note 1, at 422
n.3, 423, 428 & 509 n.17 ("States can continue to enforce international law unless barred by
federal law. Compare Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 417 (1847)."); id. atpassim; Bradley
& Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 350.
62. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 113 cmt. b. On judicial notice of international law,
see PAUST, supra note 1, at 7, 26, 46-48, 132, 157, 265 & 271.
63. Christian County Court v. Rankin & Tharp, 63 Ky. (2 Duvall) 502, 505-06 (1866),
quoted more fully in PAUST, supra note 1, at 200-01; 263-64 (citing other state court cases of a
related nature); see also supra note 52.
64. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13676 (June 10, 1997)
(stating that under "the well-pleaded complaint rule," if the complaint alleges only state law
causes of action, removal will not obtain unless there is "a cause of action necessarily requiring
'the resolution of a substantial question of federal law.' "); Torres v. Southern Peru Copper
Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997); Baker v. Bell Helicopter/Textron, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1007,
1011-12 (N.D. Tex. 1995); see also Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1348-49
(S.D. Tex. 1995).
65. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 857 n.275, with PAUST, supra note
1, at 14-18, and HENKIN, supra note 1, at 233 (affirming that international law is binding on
all).
66. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 838, and Bradley & Goldsmith II,
supra note 26, at 325, with PAUST, supra note 1, at 1-3, 10-14 & 151, and Jordan J. Paust, The
Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of Customary Human Rights, 25 GEO. J. INT'L &
Cocmp. L. 147, 147, 150, 155-58, 161-62, 164 (1996). In Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26,
at 838 n.153, Bradley and Goldsmith miscite The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1871), which
actually noted that customary international law is founded on the "common consent of man-
kind." Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 187-88 (emphasis added).
67. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 838, and Lessig, supra note 29, at
1796-97 with PAUST, supra note 1, at 10-17, 28, Paust, supra note 66, at 151-52. Bradley and
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domestic legal processes;" that it does not extend to or address "domestic
enforcement," access to courts, or remedies (including punitive dam-
ages); 69 and that it was antithetical for customary legal rights of
individuals to obtain against states, especially against one's own state.7°
In another article, Professor Bradley states that there are no 19th
Century cases actually invalidating a presidential or congressional act.7t
This would not be surprising, since it seems that well into the 20th Cen-
tury no one expected that the President or Congress could even authorize
a violation of customary international law and nothing in the text or
structure of the Constitution permits such a result. Actually, it is more
Goldsmith also miscite J. L. Brierly concerning state "consent." See Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 26, at 838-39 & n. 154. Brierly actually recognized a significant difference between
"consent" and expectation. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 51-52 (6th ed. 1963) ("a
customary rule is observed, not because it has been consented to, but because it is believed to
be binding ... [and such] does not depend... on the approval of the individual or the
state .... ).
68. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 819 n.19, Bradley & Goldsmith II,
supra note 26, at 321, 332 (quoting Louis Henkin), id. at 346, and Bradley & Goldsmith III,
supra note 26, at 2274, with PAUST, supra note 1, at 8, 198-203, 212, 256, 259-64 &passim.
69. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith 11, supra note 26, at 346, and Bradley & Goldsmith
Ii, supra note 26, at 2274, with PAUST, supra note 1, at 8, 34 n.38, 49 n.75, 198-203, 212,
256-72, 280 n.556 & 292, supra note 6 and accompanying text, and infra note 97. Bradley and
Goldsmith erroneously add that in Filartiga the district court's adoption of punitive damages
"was not contemplated by ... international law .... Bradley & Goldsmith tI, supra note 26, at
346; but see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); PAUST, supra note
1, at 203, 271-72 n.526, 212 & 292 n.621.
70. Compare Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 511 (quoting MARK W. JANIS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 245 (2 ed. 1993)), id. at 513, Bradley & Gold-
smith, supra note 26, at 822 (incorrect and incomplete list of alleged categories of customary
international laws quoted), id. at 831 & n.106, 828 & 839-42, and Bradley & Goldsmith tI,
supra note 26, at 335 & 359, with PAUST, supra note 1, at 8, 44, 169-75, 198-203, 209-10,
256-70, 288-91, 323-25, 329, 333 & passim, Ferris v. Coover, 10 Cal. 589, 619 (1858)
(private rights in property protected "[bly the law of nations, independent of treaty stipula-
tions"), Vanderslice & Clarkson v. Hanks, 3 Cal. 27, 37 (1852) (regarding "legal rights of
private persons. By the law of nations they are equally protected without any treaty stipula-
tions"), Reynolds v. West, I Cal. 322, 328 (1850) (same), Woodworth v. Fulton, I Cal. 295,
306 (1850) ("the law of nations, which, as it is a part of the laws of all civilized countries,
forms also a branch of American jurisprudence. By international law private rights are unaf-
fected by conquest."), Territory of New Mexico v. Delinquent Tax List, 73 P. 621, 622 (N.M.
1903) ("The effect of this treaty, and indeed, of the law of nations independent of the treaty,
was to leave titles ... perfect and complete under the United States. They were 'intrinsically
valid' and needed 'no sanction from the legislative or judicial departments ... '), and United
States v. Lucero, I N.M. 422, 429 (1869) ("the right of the people to have their title to their
property recognized and confirmed" has been settled by the Supreme Court as "the law of na-
tions"). Bradley and Goldsmith have a generally impoverished and nearly Borkian view of the
reach of customary international law. See Bradley & Goldsmith II, see supra note 26, at 359-
60. For a fuller range of early subjects is identified, see, for example, PAUST, supra note 1, at 8,
49-50, 169-76, 182-83 & 207-10 (addressing Borkian errors).
71. See Bradley, Status of Customary International Law, supra note 33, at 14; but see
PAUST, supra note 1, at 138 n.96 (discussing an 1892 case).
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telling that there were no cases holding that presidential or congressional
acts prevail against customary international law until the mid-1980s
when a complete and unprofessional misreading of The Paquete
Habana" occurred, all in lower federal court cases concerning the mis-
treatment of aliens." Further, in the 20th Century, there are cases
allowing customary international law to prevail against Executive acts,74
including The Paquete Habana, and congressional legislation. 7' As my
treatise documents with respect to presidential power, rulings concerning
similar claims (e.g., concerning the primacy of customary international
law over acts of lower officials and even alleged orders or approval by
the President) are near rulings, and overwhelming patterns of legal ex-
pectation that the President and other federal officials are bound by
international law have long supported these results.76 Of course, Article
II, section 3, of the Constitution requires the President faithfully to exe-
cute the "Laws," an unavoidable constitutional duty that also happens to
enhance presidential power to enforce customary international law.77
72. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
73. See PAUST, supra note 1, at 92-95, 146, 148-50 & 161-64; Bradley, Breard, supra
note 27, at 552 & n. 129 (ignoring Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,
261 (1984) (O'Connor, J., opinion)). Because newer cases rest on a complete and serious mis-
reading of The Paquete Habana and are not supported by the text and structure of the
Constitution and the views of the Founders, they should be overruled. With respect to Con-
gress, the judiciary apparently never questioned that customary international law conditioned
congressional power and that such law would prevail in case of an unavoidable clash until
dictum appeared in unreasoned federal opinions in 1919 and 1925. See id. at 6, 38-39, 88-97,
120-23, 127-29 & 138-41.
74. See PAUST, supra note 1, at 146, 149 & 163-64. Professors Bradley and Goldsmith
argue "if CIL is not federal law, then there is no basis for the federal judiciary to enforce CIL
against the President." Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 846; see also Koh, supra note 1,
at 1835 n.61, 1839 (theoretic assumption that CIL is mere common law that the President can
ignore and "supervise"); but see id. at 1842 (noting the actual ruling in The Paquete Habana).
It is telling then that the federal judiciary has long expected that it can enforce customary inter-
national law against the Executive and did so in The Paquete Habana. It is apparently also
important to Bradley and Smith's theory that "federal court interpretations of CIL would not be
binding .... Id. at 870. In The Paquete Habana, however, judicial interpretations were quite
contrary to those of the President and were nonetheless binding. See PAUST, supra note 1, at
148-49, 158 & 163-64. As the Restatement declares: "a determination or interpretation of
international law by the Supreme Court would also bind the Executive branch .... " RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 21, § 112 reporters' note 1. See also infra note 81.
75. See PAUST, supra note 1, at 138-39, 141.
76. See id. at 88, 124-25, 143-46 & 154-60. Bradley and Goldsmith admit that if custom-
ary international law "is not federal law, it is not by itself binding.., on even low-level
executive officials .... Bradley & Goldsmith I, supra note 26, at 352. From their admission
and the unswerving recognition until the mid-1980s that federal officials are bound by custom-
ary international law, it follows that customary international law is federal law. See also supra
note 74.
77. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 6, 34-37.
Michigan Journal of International Law
Additional errors include Professor Bradley and Goldsmith's state-
ment that the only appropriate "sovereigns" are either the federal
government or the states;" that only one court of appeal ever addressed
whether the President is bound by customary international law;7 9 that
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino ° "actually denied that all of CIL
(customary international law) was enforceable federal law" and "did not
hold that CIL was federal law;"8' and that "much of traditional CIL
[customary international law] is only relevant to international diplomatic
78. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 852, with PAUST, supra note 1, at
171-72, 194, 328-31, 347-49, 353 & 469-70.
79. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 845 & n.199, with PAUST, supra
note 1, at 155 ns.8-9, 13-14, 158-59 nn.28, 31, 36-37, 161 n.61 & 164 n.68.
80. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
81. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 860, and Bradley & Goldsmith II,
supra note 26, at 325, with Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428, 430 n.34
("There are, of course, areas of international law in which consensus as to standards is greater
and which do not represent a battleground for conflicting ideologies. This decision in no way
intimates that the courts of this country are broadly foreclosed from considering questions of
international law."), Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 881 (using the Sabbatino approach with
respect to generally shared patterns of legal expectation that supply customary normative con-
tent), Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 481-82, 484 & n.119, and Jordan J. Paust, 18 VA. J.
INT'L L. 601 (1978) (letter) [hereinafter Paust, letter]. See also Glennon, supra note 24, at 1553
(citing that Bradley and Goldsmith's claim that federal court interpretations of customary inter-
national law should not bind the political branches is belied by "[n]umerous Supreme Court
cases" and "Sabbatino and its progeny, far from supporting" a so-called principle connected
with their argument, "flatly reject it .... ).
The quotes from Sabbatino offered by Bradley and Goldsmith are incomplete and seriously
misleading. See Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 337 n.97 (misquoting 376 U.S. at
428, and manipulating the phrase "unambiguous agreement" to suit their argument by making
the word "agreement" plural). What the Court referred to was an unambiguous agreement con-
cerning the content of international law. The actual context in which the phrase appears makes
this clear: "in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling
legal principles .... There are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion
seems to be so divided.... The disagreement as to relevant international standards .. " 376
U.S. at 430 n.34. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 481-82, 484 & n.119; Paust, letter,
supra at 601-03. The Court also looked to evidences of customary international law in connec-
tion with this inquiry, but found this evidence to be so "divided" and inconsistent that it fails to
support a customs norm, despite an allocation in the complaint that a norm exists. 376 U.S. at
428-30. See Paust, letter, supra, at 601--04.
Contrary to Bradley and Goldsmith's new position, it makes sense to defer generally to the
political branches concerning merely "foreign relations" or "policy" as such, but to identify and
apply customary international law in cases or controversies before federal courts. But see
Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 338; Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at
525-26 (openly arguing from judicial deference regarding mere "relations" and "policy" as
such that courts should also abdicate judicial power and responsibility under Article HI, Sec. 2,
cl. I and Article VI, cl. 2 of the Constitution to apply law); cf id. at 531 (rightly noting the
"traditional judicial role and competence" re: "evaluating the content of international law").
Concerning judicial power and responsibility to identify and apply customary international law,
see, for example, PAUST, supra note 1, at 7-9, 26, 34-35, 38, 40-44, 46-48, 100, 121, 148-51,
159-64, 198-203 & passim, and see supra notes 1-2, 5-6, 8, 13-18, 20, 22, 24-25 & 31.
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relations and never arises in domestic litigation ... and is no longer rele-
vant.
82
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith have also seriously misinterpreted
The Paquete Habana, especially with respect to the actual position of the
United States before the Supreme Court and the ruling that Executive
actions were in violation of the law of nations, were thus invalidated, and
were redressable in our courts,83 a ruling upheld in an opinion by Justice
Holmes some three years later. 4 Moreover, the split in authorities con-
cerning the primacy of customary international law over a federal statute
was not adequately addressed.85 With respect to the split, there is sparse
82. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith H, supra note 26, at 326, 359-60, with PAUST, supra
note 1, at 8, 48-50 (historic reach of the law of nations, including domestic jurisdiction and
remedies) and id. at 198-203, 212, 256-72, 280 n.556 & 292, and supra notes 1-20. See also
Bradley & Goldsmith I1, supra note 26, at 325 (stating in error that "the focus of pre-World
War H CIL" was "law regulating the relations among nations"); but see Bradley, Charming
Betsy, supra note 27, at 510 ("[L]aw of nations regulated to some extent the behavior of indi-
viduals."). They also misstate and ignore some of the early history of the Alien Tort Claims Act
("ATCA"). See Bradley & Goldsmith H, supra note 26, at 360-61, 363-64. Regarding early
history and the ATCA, see, for example, Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810-11 (D.S.C.
1795) (No. 1607); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795); PAUST, supra note 1, at 207-08, 282-84 nn.
571-81; and Jordan J. Paust, Litigating Human Rights: A Commentary on the Comments, 4
Hous. J. INT'L L. 81, 84-5 (1981). For example, to state that at the time of the ATCA, extrater-
ritorial use of the ATCA would have been unthinkable, see Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note
26, at 361, is to ignore I Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795), Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810, and other
historic expectations, including those concerning both transitory and universal jurisdiction
relevant to several early subjects of customary international law. See also PAUST, supra note 1,
at 8, 206, 280 nn.556-557, 393, 402-03 & 405. And Bradley and Goldsmith misstate the scope
of § 2 (a) of the Torture Victim Protection Act. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith H, supra note
26, at 365, Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 523 n.253 (missing "apparent author-
ity"), with § 2 (a) of the Act; Jordan J. Paust, Suing Karadzic, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 91, 94
(1997).
83. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 842-43 & n.177, 845 n.199 & 849,
Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 324 & n.27, 335 ("did not bind the Executive"), id.
at 352 & n.185, 353 n.191, and Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 498 n.98 (but see
id. at 504 n.126 (recognizing one of the recent cases applying customary international law
directly to bind the Executive)), with PAUST, supra note 1, at 92-95, 146, 148-50, 161-64, and
Jordan J. Paust, Paquete and the President: Rediscovering the Brief for the United States, 34
VA. J. INT'L L. 981 (1994). Also, contrary to Bradley and Goldsmith, see Bradley & Goldsmith
11, supra note 26, at 352 & n.185, the Court did not state that customary international law "is
judicially enforceable" where there is no treaty, etc., but stated that courts must enforce cus-
tomary international law where there is no treaty, etc., leaving unaddressed when courts may
also enforce customary international law. See PAUST, supra note 1, at 136-38 nn.93-95, 148-
50 & 162-63 n.63.
84. See United States v. The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453 (1903); Paust, supra note 83,
at 983 n.8, 988.
85. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 843, with PAUST, supra note 1, at
38-39, 88-95, 120-23 & 138-41; see also Koh, supra note 1, at 1835 n.61 (making theoretic
assumption that CIL is mere common law that can be trumped by a federal statute); id. at 1839;
see supra note 73. Concerning The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815), compare Bradley
& Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 843, with PAUST, supra note 1, at 128-29. Concerning Brown
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precedent on either side. Nonetheless, no Supreme Court opinion has
expressly approved the primacy of a federal statute, and a few Supreme
Court opinions, plus what are still predominant trends in legal decision,
actually support the primacy of customary international law.86
Finally, Professors Bradley and Goldsmith complain that customary
international law, highly valued by our Founders87 and the most
democratic form of international law,88 is somehow anti-democratic.89
With respect to democratic values, it is worth emphasizing that no single
institutional arrangement necessarily represents authority or guarantees a
democratic functioning or outcome.9 ° At any given time, legislative
bodies may merely represent special interests. The same pertains with
respect to administrative bodies.9' Moreover, the Founders had worried
about the dangers of oppression and denial of rights by a government
that is a mere instrument of the majority. Judicial power is an integral
v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814), compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26,
at 843, with PAUST, supra note 1, at 123-24, 144-45 & 156.
Professor Bradley recently sought to cover up this significant split by arguing that "it is
well settled" that "courts are to apply" a federal statute in case of a clear conflict with custom-
ary international law and that "lower courts unanimously have held" that this result should
occur. Bradley, Breard, supra note 27, at 549 (erroneous and misleading statement: "lower
courts uniformly have held"); Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 498-99 & n.98, 532;
see also id. at 484 (arguing that The Charming Betsy did not require an override of statutes-
but see Section IV of this essay). Bradley also misreads The Paquete Habana. See Bradley,
Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 498 n.98. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577-79 (1953)
seemed to state merely that a maritime doctrine of construction does not limit the power of
Congress. Dictum in The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 39-40 (1826) is more sup-
portive of Professor Bradley's preference. Concerning the RESTATEMENT'S ambiguous
comment about "pre-existing" customary international law, compare Bradley, Charming Betsy,
supra note 27, at 498, with PAUST, supra note 1, at 94, 141 nn.98-99.
86. See generally PAUST, supra note 1, at 6, 38-39, 88-90, 94-95, 99-101, 120-23, 138-
41, 152 & 165-66; see infra notes 145-147, 155-156 & 160-172 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at vii, 1, 5-6, 8, 10, 15-17, 34-37, 40-45, 47-50, 120-
23, 139, 144-45, 154-55, 170-76, 182-83, 214-24 & passim; see also Neuman, supra note 27,
at 383 ("rather late to claim that judicial application of customary international law was in prin-
ciple inconsistent with the American understanding of democracy."), quoted in Koh, supra note
1, at 1852.
88. See PAUST, supra note 1, at 2-3, 11, 13-14 and references cited; see generally Koh,
supra note 1, at 1854, 1857-58 (stating that customary international law is democratic because
there are various public and private actors involved). It is especially relevant that all individuals
can participate directly or indirectly in the formation, change, and termination of customary
international law. The Internet era should further democratize these forms of participation.
89. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 821, 857-58, 868 & 871.
90. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 462-63; Koh, supra note 1, at 1854 & nn.172-173;
James A.R. Nafziger, Political Dispute Resolution by the World Court, with Reference to
United States Courts, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 2-3,
on file with author).
91. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173 (1997); see supra note 90.
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part of the constitutional design for the separation of powers92 and
reflects, in part, "the profound conviction of the Framers that the powers
conferred on Congress were the powers to be most carefully
circumscribed." 93 Additionally, our democratic process has provided
constitutional and statutory bases for judicial incorporation of customary
international law.94
As noted, human rights, the preferred consequences of democracy,
are especially relevant to such a constitutional design and were of signifi-
cant concern to the Founders. It would be preposterous to claim that
judicial enforcement of customary human rights "is inconsistent with
fundamental constitutional values." 95 More generally in human history,
democracies have fostered, and dictatorships have feared, customary in-
ternational law, 96 especially the guaranteeing of human rights for each
human being. One can conceive of a democracy in complete isolation,
although with an increasing global interdependence such a conception is
ethereal. Nonetheless, to paraphrase the European Court of Human
Rights, one can scarcely conceive of a democracy without fundamental
human rights, 97 especially the right of access to courts.
92. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 7-8, 34-48, 198-202, 264-70, 367, 374 &passim.
93. I.N.S. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 947, 951 (1983); see also PAUST, supra note 1, at 349
n.44 (quoting from a Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (1788)); Eugene V.
Rostow, President, Prime Minister or Constitutional Monarch?, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 743-
44 (1989) (quoting Madison in THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48).
94. See supra notes 5-6, 15, 22-24 & 48; Koh, supra note 1, at 1852-53.
95. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 1, at 369, with supra notes 1, 5-6, 15,
22-24, 31 & 48.
96. See also PAUST, supra note 1, at 194, 223 n.III & 323.
97.
One can scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there being a possibility of
having access to the courts.... The principle whereby a civil claim must be capable
of being submitted to a judge ranks as one of the universally 'recognized' funda-
mental principles of law; the same is true of the principle of international law which
forbids the denial of justice.
Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R., ser. A, paras. 34-35 (1975); see also Democracy
and Legitimacy-Is There an Emerging Duty to Ensure a Democratic Government in General
and Regional Customary International Law? (panel discussion), in CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ISSUES: SHARING PAN-EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 126-41 (1992);
PAUST, supra note 1, at 170-76, 180, 194, 219-20, 364 & 379 n.14. The right to an effective
remedy in domestic tribunals for human rights violations is a fundamental human right. See,
e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 198-203, 256-72. Article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") upholds "a series of individual rights such as equality
before courts and tribunals," applies to procedures to determine their "rights and obligations in
a suit at law," and guarantees "equality before the courts, including equal access to courts."
General Comment No. 13 (21), Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., Supp. No 40, at 143, U.N. Doc. A/39/40, 11 1-3 (1984).
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III. ERRORS CONCERNING THE RELEVANCE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith shift from customary international
law as such to argue that certain reservations, understandings, and decla-
rations with respect to newer human rights treaties ratified by the United
States demonstrate "that the treaties not apply as domestic law and thus
not preempt inconsistent state law."98 they "ensure that these international
human rights treaties do not apply as domestic federal law and do not
preempt inconsistent state law;" 99 and add that "[t]his means that the fed-
eral political branches have declared ... that a principal source of the
CIL (customary international law) of human rights should not be consid-
ered a source of federal law;"' ° and that such treaties have "no effect on
contrary domestic law absent subsequent federal legislation."'' Professor
Peter Spiro, focusing on the federal clauses in certain United States in-
struments of ratification, is more cautious. He argues that use of the
"federalism" understandings "appears to deny operability where a treaty
provision infringes on constitutionally protected state powers;'
0 2
"appears to have achieved the same result" as defeated Bricker amend-
ments;"'0 ' and "[a]lthough they have no international effect, and can be
plausibly read as 'wholly circular' and without independent meaning,'0
the context of their adoption evinces a consistent refusal to displace state
law with international human rights obligations."'0 5 There are several er-
rors in these statements.
A. Self-Execution Declarations and Supremacy
Although the instruments of ratification for certain human rights
treaties contain a declaration that much (but not all) of the articles are
98. Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 340; see also Bradley & Goldsmith III, su-
pra note 26, 2269 ("ensure that the treaty norms do not apply as supreme federal law and do
not affect the validity of inconsistent state law."); see infra note 116.
99. Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 340; see also Bradley & Goldsmith III, su-
pra note 26, at 2269.
100. Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 26, at 340.
101. Id. at 366 (emphasis in original); see also Bradley, Channing Betsy, supra note 27,
at 497 ("not given effect.., in the absence of implementing legislation," thus also missing
other uses of such law, including indirect incorporation as an interpretive aid). It should be
noted that federal legislation is not the only method of executing a treaty. See, e.g., PAUST,
supra note 1, at 62-63, 97-98 (explaining that such treaties are also executable by another
treaty, an executive agreement, or an executive order that has the force of law).
102. See Spiro, supra note 52, at 575.
103. Id. at 576.
104. Id. at 577, citing Neuman, supra note 52, at 52.
105. Spiro, supra note 52, at 577.
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"non-self-executing," such declarations function as reservations that are
fundamentally inconsistent with the objects and purposes of the treaties
and, under international law, are thus void ab initio and can have no legal
effect.' 6 Even if portions were "non-self-executing" in a general sense or
in the special sense preferred by the Executive upon adoption (relating
merely to the creation of a private cause of action directly under the trea-
ties and thus not precluding use defensively, in a habeas petition, for
supremacy purposes, or indirectly to interpret other law 07), the treaties
should still trump inconsistent state law under the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution and the doctrine of federal preemption. 08
106. See, e.g., General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee under Article
40, 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Addendum, Hum. Rts.
Comm., General Comment No. 24 (52), 11. 7-9, 11-12, 20, at 3-5, 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
21/Rev. l/Add.6 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment No. 24], reprinted in PAUST, supra note
1, at 374-76; PAUST, supra note 1, at 361-68, 373-76; Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note
27, at 521 n.245; Jordan J. Paust, Race-Based Affirmative Action and International Law, 18
MICH. J. INT'L L.659, 671 & nn.43-44 (1997) [hereinafter Paust, Affirmative Action]. General
Comment No. 24 explains that although such a declaration is void, it is severable, and the rati-
fying state is bound by the treaty. General Comment No. 24, supra at para. 20; see also PAUST,
supra note 1, at 376, 381 n.30; Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Geno-
cide, 1951 I.C.J. 1, 15; Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995), reprinted in 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 98 (1996); Belios v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1998).
The interpretations of the Covenant by the Human Rights Committee created by the Cove-
nant are authoritative. See Report of the Committee, 1994 Report, vol. 1, 49 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 40 U.N. Doc. A/49/40, para. 5 ("General comments ... are intended ... [among
other purposes] to clarify the requirements of the Covenant .... ); RICHARD B. LILLICH &
HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 224 (3 ed. 1995) ("the Human Rights
Committee from time to time has issued general comments about the nature of the obligations
states have assumed under particular articles of the Covenant .... they are... the gloss ... put
on the Covenant's substantive provisions .... ); United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 46
n.4 (D. Mass. 1997) ("[T]he Human Rights Committee has the ultimate authority to decide
whether parties' clarifications or reservations have any effect."), citing Manfred Nowak, The
Activities of the U.N. Human Rights Committee: Developments from 1 August 1992 to 31 July
1995, 16 Hum. Rts. L.J. 377, 380 (1995).
107. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 102-23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Explanation of Proposed Res-
ervations, Understandings and Declarations, at 19, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 657 (1992)
[hereinafter Executive Explanation] ("The intent is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a
private cause of action in U.S. courts."); Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 521 n.244;
Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights during the 1990s: New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65
U. CINN. L. REV. 423, 467 & 470 (1997); Thomas M. McDonnell, Defensively Invoking Trea-
ties in American Courts-Jurisdictional Challenges under the U.N. Drug Trafficking
Convention by Foreign Defendants Kidnapped Abroad by U.S. Agents, 37 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1401 (1996); John Quigley, Human Rights Defenses in U.S. Courts, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 555
(1998); Paust, Affirmative Action, supra note 106, at 672 n.45.
108. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1948) (Black, J., concurring)
(finding that human rights articles in U.N. Charter, which to date have not been found to be
self-executing, provide additional reasons why a California "law stands as an obstacle to the
free accomplishment of our policy in the international field" and cannot prevail); id. at 672-73
(Murphy, J., concurring) ("Its inconsistency with the Charter... is but one more reason why
the statute must be condemned"); Gordon v. Kerr, 10 F. Cas. 801, 802 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806)
(seemingly non-self-executing treaty "is supreme" over state constitution); 6 Op. Att'y Gen.
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The Supremacy Clause mandates that "all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding,"'' 9 not that some treaties or only "self-executing"
treaties have that effect."0 Certainly a mere declaration of a President,
even with full consent of the Senate, cannot alter a constitutional com-
mand. Thus, a declaration of non-self-execution, even if not void under
international law, is unconstitutional and void under the Supremacy
Clause."' Moreover, as the Supreme Court emphasized with broad lan-
guage in United States v. Pink,"2 "state law must yield when it is
inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty ...
[and] must give way before the superior Federal policy evidenced by a
treaty. . ...'. Such a preemptive role of non-self-executing treaties is
291, 293 (1854) (finding that all treaties are supreme law over that of the states-even treaties
requiring "enactment of a statute to regulate the details"); PAUST, supra note 1, at 62-64, 68,
97, 134-35; Louis B. SOHN, THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF Hu-
MAN RIGHTS 947 (1973); BURNS H. WESTON, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 192 (1980); de la Vega, supra note 107, at 457 n.206, 460, 467 & 470; Joan Fitzpatrick,
The Preemptive and Interpretive Force of International Human Rights Law in State Courts, 90
AM. Soc. INT'L L. PRoc. 262, 264 (1996); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 867
n.65 (1987); Paust, Affirmative Action, supra note 106, at 671-72 & n.45; Carlos M. Vazquez,
Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1097-1104
(1992); Quincy Wright, National Courts and Human Rights-The Fujii Case, 45 AM. J. INT'L
L. 62, 69 (1951); see also Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. State, 89 Tex. 340,
34 S.W. 746 (1896) ("the adoption of a treaty with the stipulations of which the provisions of a
State law are inconsistent, is equivalent to the repeal of the State law. Deen ex-demise Fisher v.
Harndon, I Paine 55."); Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 49, 64 & 67-69 (1997) (maintaining that declarations of non-self-execution are
"inconsistent with the language, history, and purpose of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution"
and are constitutionally suspect); but see In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F.
Supp. 544, 590 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.2d 713, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). Sub-
sequent legal developments have obviated the two prongs of the Sei Fuji rationale. See PAUST,
supra note 1, at 74, 282. Concerning the ICCPR, see also Executive Explanation, supra note
107, at 18 (emphasis added)("the Covenant will apply to state and local authorities").
109. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
110. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 21 § 115 cmt. e (emphasis added) ("any
treaty... supersedes inconsistent State law or policy.... Even a non-self-executing agree-
ment... may sometimes be held to be federal policy superseding State law or policy . . . [and]
may also... preempt.").
111. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 51, 55, 59, 63-64, 366-68, 370-71 & 374; Halber-
stain, supra note 108 (addressing remarks of Professors Frederick Abbott, Lori Fisler
Damrosch, Louis Henkin, and Stefan Riesenfeld).
112. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
113. Id. at 230-31. On supremacy more generally, see, for example, Asakura v. City of
Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 213 U.S. 268, 272-73
(1909); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 271 & 274-76 (1817); Owings v. Norwood's
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consistent with the express language of Article VI of the Constitution,
and denial of such a role would not be consistent with the language of the
Constitution or views of the Founders. 14
Additionally, the declaration concerning the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights"' is not a general declaration of non-self-
execution, but one that is expressly limited. It merely addresses Articles
1-27, and expressly does not apply to Article 50. Article 50 reaches back
to all "[t]he provisions" of the Covenant and mandates, consistently with
the command of the U.S. Constitution: "The provisions of the present
Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limita-
tions or exceptions."' 16 Such "shall" language is mandatory and self-
executory. ' 7 Moreover, the declaration should be interpreted consistently
with Article 50 of the Covenant to preserve rights, since treaties are to
be construed in a broad manner to protect express and implied rights."8
Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37
("any treaty," "every treaty"), 244-45 (Chase, J.), 249, 256 (Paterson, J.), 272, 276-77 & 279
(Iredell, J.), 281 (Wilson, J.), 282, 284 (Cushing, J.), (1796); Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 160, 162 (1792); Hamilton v. Eaton, 11 F. Cas. 336, 337-38, 340 & 342 (C.C.D. N.C.
1792); Gordon v. Kerr, 10 F. Cas. 801, 802 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806); Page v. Pendleton, I Wythe
Rep. 127, 129 & 132 (Va. May 3, 1793); 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 291, 293 (1854); 1 Op. Att'y Gen.
26, 27 (1792); Peters v. McKay, 238 P.2d 225, 230-31 (Or. 1951); PAUST, supra note 1, at 51-
57, 62-64, 67-68, 92, 97, 133-35, 143, 202, 314, 384, 386 & 413; Fitzpatrick, supra note 108,
at 262 & 264.
114. For relevant views of the Founders, see, for example, PAUST, supra note 1, at 51-55,
65-68. See also Halberstam, supra note 108.
115. Open for signature, December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. This treaty came into
force for the United States on September 8, 1992. See RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HAN-
NUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 261 (3 ed.
1995).
116. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature, Decem-
ber 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 50. See also Executive Explanation, supra note 107, at 18
(emphasis added) ("the Covenant will apply to state and local authorities .... [and it will be
implemented] by appropriate ... judicial means, federal or state .... ). Professor Bradley ig-
nores the effect of Article 50 and has even stated incorrectly that the declaration of non-self-
execution applies to the entire treaty. See Bradley, Breard, supra note 27, at 540.
117. See PAUST, supra note 1, at 55-59, 62, 69-71, 74, 110 & 112.
118. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933); Nielsen v. John-
son, 279 U.S. 47, 51 (1929); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928); Asakura v. City of
Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924) ("Treaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit,
and, when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it
and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred."); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S.
446, 448 (1924) ("Construing the treaty liberally in favor of the rights claimed under it, as we
are bound to do .. "); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) ("where a treaty admits of
two constructions, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable
to them, the latter is to be preferred."); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 487 (1879)
("Where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive as to the rights, that may be
claimed under it, and the other liberal, the latter is to be preferred."), citing Shanks v. Dupont,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 249 (1830) ("If the treaty admits of two interpretations, and one is limited,
and the other liberal; one which will further, and the other exclude private rights; why should
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Indeed, it was recognized in the formal Executive Explanation concern-
ing the Covenant:
In light of Article 50 ... , it is appropriate to clarify that ... the
Covenant will apply to state and local authorities.... the intent
is not to modify or limit U.S. undertakings under the Cove-
nant.... [It is] intended to signal to our treaty partners that the
U.S. will implement its obligations under the Covenant by ap-
propriate legislative, executive and judicial means, federal or
state as appropriate .... 119
Thus, even if the declaration of non-self-execution were operative,
the treaty is partly self-executing, has the force and effect of law, and is
supreme federal law. Importantly also, the declaration concerning the
Covenant is further limited by its special meaning. As noted above, the
intent was merely to clarify that the Covenant not be used directly to
"create a private cause of action."'2 Thus, in view of the limited nature of
the declaration (e.g., that it does not inhibit the reach of Article 50) and
its special meaning (i.e., that it merely not be used directly to create a
cause of action), the Covenant can be self-executing for every other pur-
pose. At a minimum, the Executive Explanations, consistently with
Article 50 of the Covenant and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion, assure that the Covenant's provisions have full effect when used to
override any inconsistent state law.
Additionally, even generally non-self-executing treaties are still law
of the United States and can be used indirectly as aids for interpretation
of other laws, defensively in civil or criminal contexts, for supremacy or
preemptive purposes, or to provide a compelling state interest. 12' For ex-
not the most liberal exposition be adopted?"); see also Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.) ("Whenever a right grows out of, or is protected
by, a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the laws and judicial decisions of the states; and who-
ever may have this right, it is to be protected.") (emphasis added).
119. Executive Explanation, supra note 107, at 18 (emphasis added).
120. Supra note 107 and accompanying text. For the Executive Explanations concerning
the declaration, see supra note 107, and Article 50, see supra note 116, provide a consistent
approach: the declaration merely limits the use of the Covenant directly to create a cause of
action and does not inhibit direct or indirect use of the Covenant as law of the United States in
any other way. Such an approach is also generally consistent with the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.
121. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 62-64, 68, 92, 97-98, 134-35, 370, 377-78 n.4 &
384; de la Vega, supra note 107, at 457 n.206, 460, 467 & 470; Fitzpatrick, supra note 108, at
264; Paust, Affirmative Action, supra note 106, at 672 n.45; but see Bradley, Charming Betsy,
supra note 27, at 497 n.9; Bradley, Breard, supra note 27, at 539-40 (making outrageously
erroneous statement that the Court has held that non-self executing treaties "can be enforced in
domestic courts only after and to the extent that Congress has implemented the treaties by fed-
eral statute" and, thus, ignoring indirect incorporation of such treaties as well as execution
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ample, human rights precepts have been used to inform the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 22 Human rights in the
Covenant have also been used by federal courts to clarify or provide
content of other federal law.123 Thus, such treaties can be invoked by in-
dividuals seeking relief under treaty-enhanced interpretations of federal
statutes such as civil rights legislation and habeas corpus (28 U.S.C.
§ 2254), especially since federal statutes must be interpreted consistently
with treaties.' 4 Additionally, such federal statutes can serve an
"executing" function whether or not the Covenant is partly self-
executing, especially since the primary purpose of non-self-execution is
to assure that there is some statutory or other legal base for bringing a
relevant claim. For example, even if the Covenant cannot be used di-
rectly to create a cause of action, other federal law may provide a cause
of action and allow implementation or "execution" of treaty-based hu-
man rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is such a statute.' 25 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) has
a similar effect since it provides what is equivalent to a "cause of action"
when mandating that a relevant federal court "shall entertain an applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court.., on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of ... treaties of the United States."'26 For that purpose, the
statute expressly incorporates by reference" treaties of the United
States.'27 A federal statute need not even refer to international law in or-
der to function as implementary legislation. 28 Statutes, which do so, all
the more clearly perform such a function.
through other laws and Executive acts. Compare PAUST, supra note 1, at 62-63, 92, 97-98,
134-35).
122. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 192-93, 196, 248 n.392, 253 n.449 & 371.
123. See, e.g., id. at 369-70 & 383-84 nn. 54-66 & 74.
124. See, e.g., Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); PAUST,
supra note 1, at 107-108 n.9.
125. See PAUST, supra note 1, at 179, 192-93, 226 n.163, 246-47 nn.380-81 and 383-
84, 371-72 & 385 n.88; RESTATEMENT, supra note 21 § 111, cmt. h ("There can, of course, be
instances in which the United States Constitution, or previously enacted legislation, will be
fully adequate to give effect to an apparently non-self-executing international agreement .... ).
An Executive Order can also execute a non-self-executing treaty in certain instances. See, e.g.,
PAUST, supra at 62, 97.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 179, 192-93, 226 n.163,
246-47 n.382 & 371-72 (noting also that the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350, and Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, 102nd
Cong. (Mar. 12, 1992), have an executing function).
127. Concerning incorporation by reference, see, for example, United States v. Smith, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158-62 (1820); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1942); and Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-82 (2d Cir. 1980).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Ariona, 120 U.S. 479, 488 (1887).
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B. The Meaning of the Federal Clauses
The United States instruments of ratification for certain human rights
treaties have an understanding that contains a federal clause. 129 These
clauses do not make the human rights treaties inapplicable as federal law.
On the contrary, federal clauses allow state participation through law af-
firming or effectuating choice while assuring concurrent duties to
implement the treaties through federal and state processes; create an
overall responsibility for treaty-implementation in the federal govern-
ment; and assure that, at a minimum, states cannot deny human rights
based in the treaties. 130
The International Covenant's federal clause is typical. It reads:
[T]his Convention shall be implemented by the Federal Gov-
ernment to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial
jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by
the state and local governments; to the extent that the state and
local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the
Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the Fed-
eral system to the end that the competent authorities of the state
or local governments may take appropriate measures for fulfill-
ment of the Covenant.1
3
1
Such a clause does not change the fact that human rights are assured
under the treaty, or that the Covenant's obligations are to be fulfilled.
More generally, the fact that the federal government has jurisdictional
129. See, e.g., Understanding No. 5 Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights [hereinafter Understanding No. 5], reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 659 (1992); Under-
standing Concerning the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature, March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter
CEAFRD], reprinted in Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 719, 728 (1994).
130. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 108, at 263; Paust, Affirmative Action, supra note
106, at 673-74; Elizabeth Landry, Note, States as International Law-Breakers: Discrimination
against Immigrants and Welfare Reform, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1116-17 (1996); see infra
notes 136-141.
131. Understanding No. 5, supra note 130. The "understanding" concerning the
CEAFRD, supra note 120, reads:
this Convention shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it
exercises jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the [S]tate
and local governments. To the extent that [Sitate and local governments exercise ju-
risdiction. . ., the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appropriate measures
to ensure the fulfillment of this Convention.
Nash, supra note 130, at 728.
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competence to implement treaty law is well understood.12 To what the
federal clause may be relevant is whether or not various entities within
the federal government or the states are.to proceed further to implement
human rights. For example, it may be left to the discretion of the United
States to exercise its jurisdictional competence to implement the Cove-
nant or to allow states to proceed to take affirmative steps to implement
the treaty. If the states do not proceed, the United States remains bound
by the treaty and is ultimately responsible for domestic implementation.
Ultimate responsibility exists as a matter of general international law.'33 It
is also evident in the federal clause in the phrases "shall be implemented"
and "shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that
the competent authorities of the state or local governments may take ap-
propriate measures for fulfillment of the Covenant."'
34
Additionally, this responsibility is especially assured by Article 50 of
the Covenant, which requires: "The provisions of the present Covenant
shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or ex-
ceptions.' ' 3' As David Stewart of the Office of the Legal Adviser of the
U.S. Department of State recognized, "Article 50 ... was included pre-
cisely to prevent federal states from limiting their obligations to areas
within the federal government's authority), a reservation exempting con-
stituent units might readily be characterized as contrary to the object and
purpose of the Article, if not the Covenant as a whole.'
136
132. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); United States v. Hann, 26 F.
Cas. 227 (C.C. S.D. Ala. 1860); PAUST, supra note 1, at 97-98, 207, 256 n.468, 282 nn.563-
70, 371-72 & 385 nn.85-88; Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions:
The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 341, 345-46 (1995) (editorial comments).
The same applies with respect to customary international law. See, e.g., United States v. Ar-
jona, 120 U.S. 479, 483-88 (1887); Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691, 692-93 (D.C. Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 640 (1939); PAUST, supra note 1, at 6, 33, 39, 130 & 394.
133. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 207 (a)-(c), reporters' note 3; Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 27 ("A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty .... ); Henkin,
supra note 133, at 346.
134. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
135. ICCPR art. 50.
136. David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1183, 1201 (1993).
[T]he Covenant will apply to state and local authorities.... [and] with respect to
Article 50... the intent is not to modify or limit U.S. undertakings under the Cove-
nant .... [It is] intended to signal ... that the U.S. will implement its obligations
under the Covenant by appropriate legislative, executive and judicial means, federal
or state as appropriate....
Executive Explanation, supra note 107, at 18, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 656-57 (emphasis
added); see also PAUST, supra note 1, at 361, 363; Fitzpatrick, supra note 108, at 263, and
Landry, supra note 131, at 1116, quoting the Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Re-
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With respect to the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("CEAFRD"), the duty to take action
is strong. For example, Article 2 (2) of the CEAFRD requires the United
States, "when the circumstances so warrant," to take "special and con-
crete measures" of affirmative action. '37 Under the federal clause, it may
be left to the discretion of the United States to exercise its jurisdictional
competence to mandate special measures or to allow states to proceed,
but if the states do not proceed, the United States is bound by Article 2 of
the treaty to take action (i.e., there is no gap in the United States duty
under Article 2 merely because neither the states nor federal govern-
mental entities have yet proceeded to adopt special measures). 1
38
With respect to the states, at a minimum, they cannot deny human
rights assured under the treaties. Indeed, the federal clauses require that
the treaties "shall be implemented ... otherwise by the state and local
governments," thereby making duties under the treaties concurrent.'39
Thus, with respect to the Covenant, the federal clause, coupled with Arti-
cle 50 of the Covenant and the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, compel states and sub-state entities to execute and effectu-
ate the treaty by choosing among affirmative and permissible options
while not denying rights under the Covenant. The federal clause of the
Race Discrimination Convention, coupled with the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution, compel the same.
Equally important, nothing in the federal clauses prohibits state or
sub-state entities from executing or further implementing the treaties.
Indeed, they recognize and confer a concurrent power to do so, especially
in the phrases: "[S]hall be implemented ... otherwise by the state and
local governments," "to the extent that the state and local governments
exercise jurisdiction," and "to the end that competent authorities of the
state or local governments may take appropriate measures for fulfillment
of the Covenant."''40 In this sense, the federal clauses delegate and
ports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add. 50, at 2-3, IN 9, 11-12 (1995), which recognized the U.S. Government's
"'readiness... to take such further measures as may be necessary to ensure that the States of
the Union implement the rights guaranteed by the Covenant'" and the "'assurances of the
Government that its declaration regarding the federal system is not a reservation and is not
intended to affect the international obligations of the United States.'
137. CEAFRD art. 2.
138. See also Nash, supra note 130, at 728 (quoting the understanding concerning the
CEAFRD) ("the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appropriate measures to en-
sure... fulfillment .. "); Stewart, supra note 138, at 1201-02 (the U.S. remains bound under
the Covenant, the U.S. will also "ensure that the state and local governments fulfill their obli-
gations," and the Understanding "concerns the steps to be taken domestically by the respective
federal and state authorities").
139. Nash, supra note 129, at 728.
140. Id.
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guarantee a competence of state and local authorities to act affirmatively
to implement human rights and to have those choices protected as long as
they are otherwise in fulfillment of the treaties. Thus, the federal clauses
provide state and local competencies to participate in treaty effectuation
in ways that might otherwise have been suspect under more inhibiting
notions of federal preemption.' The new implementary freedom
guaranteed under the treaty regimes encourages participation and
provides an opportunity for states and sub-state entities to choose
affirmative approaches to human rights implementation.
IV. MISINTERPRETATION OF THE INTERPRETIVE
ROLE OF CUSTOMARY LAW
Professor Bradley aptly relates the issue concerning the interpretive
role of customary international law to judicial power and responsibility.
Nonetheless, it is precisely because the federal judiciary has both the
power and responsibility to identify and apply customary international
law in cases otherwise properly before the courts that there is no viola-
tion of the separation of powers when federal courts apply international
law while interpreting federal statutes. Additionally, his quotation of
Chief Justice Marshall in The Charming Betsy 42 is curiously incom-
plete.143 A fuller quote actually demonstrates that rights under customary
141. See also S. Exec. Rep. 103-29, at 24 (1994) (emphasis added) (regarding the
CEAFRD: "there is no intent to preempt.., state and local initiatives or to federalize the entire
range of anti-discrimination actions") (emphasis added); Statement of Legal Adviser of the
Dep't of State, Conrad K. Harper, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 11,
1994, reprinted in Nash, supra note 130, at 726 (emphasis added) ("This is to make clear that
ratification does not preempt State and local anti-discrimination initiatives. The understanding
also makes clear that where States and localities have jurisdiction over such matters, the Fed-
eral government will ensure compliance."); Executive Explanation, supra note 107, at 19,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 657 ("intended ... that the U.S. will implement.., by appropriate
legislative, executive and judicial means, federal or state as appropriate, and that the Federal
Government will remove any federal inhibition to the States' abilities to meet their obliga-
tions.").
[An invitation to state authorities to play an active part in fulfilling the treaty's
promises" and "to: (1) provide appropriate state remedies for treaty norms; (2) assess
potential preemption... ; (3) absorb international human rights norms into the
common law lawmaking enterprise; and (4) turn to international law benchmarks in
interpreting both state constitutions and statutes.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 108, at 263-64; Landry, supra note 131, at 1116-17 ("expression of the
affirmative obligation of the states to implement the provisions of the Covenant ... an invita-
tion to state authorities .. "); Paust, Affirmative Action, supra note 106, at 674.
More generally, states can experiment within the contours of logical and policy-serving
meanings of a treaty norm, as long as there is no denial of the core of settled meaning.
142. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
143. See Bradley, Charming Besty, supra note 27, at 482.
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international law are to prevail over unavoidably inconsistent federal
statutes. What the Court actually declared was: "[A]n act of Congress
ought never be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possi-
ble construction remains, and, consequently, can never be construed to
violate ... rights ... further than is warranted by the law of nations as
understood in this country."'"
Chief Justice Marshall did not identify the consequences generally
flowing from an unavoidable clash between customary international law
and a federal statute, although he did affirm that an act of Congress "can
never be construed to violate ... rights" under the law of nations.'45 In-
deed, he identified two "principles" (i.e., one general and one special
when rights under international law are at stake). 46 Thus, although his
opinion is silent on the question whether priority generally should be
given to the law of nations or an act of Congress in case of an unavoid-
able clash, he identified a circumstance when the law of nations must
prevail-namely, when rights under international law are at stake. This is
so because an act of Congress "can never be construed to violate" such
rights unless "warranted by the law of nations," which would mean that
by the law of nations such rights would not be protected (e.g., not pro-
tected in a particular circumstance).' 47 Thus, contrary to Professor
Bradley, The Charming Betsy does require that courts use international
law to override domestic law when rights are at stake.
48
In view of Professor Bradley's theory, it is quite significant that
Chief Justice Marshall was among those early in our history who unani-
mously affirmed that the President and other officials are bound by
international law. "41 Marshall also made statements supportive of the pri-
macy of customary international law over acts of Congress,'5° and
recognized the competence and duty of our courts to apply customary
international law.'5'
Professor Bradley notes that the interpretive role of customary law
recognized in The Charming Betsy had been recognized three years
144. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118 (emphasis added).
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. PAUST, supra note 1, at 116 n.37; see id. at 138-40 n.96, 141-42 n.109.
148. But see Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 484, 497.
149. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 144-45, 154 n.2 & 155 nn.1 1-12.
150. See id. at 116 n.37, 121 n.55 (Representative Marshall stating that U.S. Const. Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 10 "cannot be considered.... as affecting acts which are piracy under the law of na-
tions" and "can never be construed to make to the Government a grant of power, which the
people making it do not themselves possess.").
151. See, e.g., id. at 34 n.38, 47 n.56 & 128 n.62 (addressing The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 388, 422-23 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[Tihe Court is bound by the law of nations
which is part of the law of the land.")); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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earlier in Talbot v. Seeman.'52 The Talbot court stated: "[T]he laws of the
United States ought not, if it be avoidable, so to be construed as to infract
the common principles and usages of nations." 153 The Court continued:
"By this construction the act of Congress will never violate those
principles which we believe, and which it is our duty to believe, the
legislature of the United States will always hold sacred. 154 In Talbot,
there was no notion expressed of a power of Congress to override
international law. Indeed, as Professor Bradley cautiously admits, the
phrase "it is our duty to believe" suggests that the Court recognized that
Congress cannot override international law and that courts, at least, must
not permit such a result.'55 That the opinion of the Court was written by
Chief Justice Marshall is also informing. Later in a circuit court decision
it was declared that a court "cannot give to ... orders a construction that
will lead to ... the executive abrogating" a right vested by the modem
law of war. "6 Professor Bradley also recognizes that even earlier in
Rutgers v. Waddington,'57 while construing a state statute so as to avoid a
conflict with the Treaty of Paris, the Rutgers court stated "[t]he repeal of
the law of nations, or any interference with it, could not have been in
contemplation ... when the Legislature passed this statute; and we think
ourselves bound to exempt that law from its operation. .. .""' Such
language also supports the predominant view at the time that domestic
legislation cannot obviate the domestic effect of customary international
law, and that the courts have a responsibility to assure that customary law
prevails.
This responsibility seems to have been affirmed in a 1792 opinion of
the Attorney General, in which Attorney General Randolph declared:
The law of nations, although not specially adopted... is essen-
tially a part of the law of the land. Its obligation commences and
runs with the existence of a nation, subject to modifications on
some points of indifference.... [W]ith regard to foreigners,
152. Talbot v. Seeman, U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801); see Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra
note 27, at 485.
153. Talbot, 1 Cranch at 43.
154. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
155. Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 496 n.89. Bradley is inconsistent when
stating on the next page that the "canon has been linked to the primacy ... of domestic law...
[and] does not mandate the application of international law." Id. at 497.
156. Johnson v. Twenty-One Bales, 13 F. Cas. 855, 863 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1814) (emphasis
added).
157. N.Y. Mayor's Court 1784, reprinted in SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR'S COURT OF
NEW YORK CITY, 1674-1784, 302 (R. Morris ed., 1935).
158. Id. at 308, 325. See Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 487 & n.41. For
other cases construing state legislation to avoid a clash with international law, see supra note
52.
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every change is at the peril of the nation which makes it. Im-
pliedly ... the law of nations is considered by the act.... "9
It is also informing that around this time other opinions recognize the
primacy of international law. 6° For example, in Bas v. Tin gy,' Justice
Chase stated: "[i]f a general war is declared [by Congress], its extent and
operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a
part of the law of nations...., 62 Thus, the law of nations does restrict
and regulate wars extent and operations. In Ross v. Rittenhouse, 63 it was
affirmed: "municipal law ... may ... facilitate or improve ... [the 'law
of nations'], provided the great universal law remains unaltered." '14 In
United States v. Palmer,'61 Justice Johnson stated: "Congress cannot
make that piracy which is not piracy by the law of nations, in order to
give jurisdiction to its own courts."' 16 6 Additionally, several statements of
the Founders are consistent with these expectations about the primacy of
customary international law.
167
Later, United States v. Darnaud,68  declared: "[I]f the Con-
gress.. .were to call upon the courts of justice to extend the jurisdiction
of the United States beyond the limits ... [set by the "law of nations"], it
would be the duty of courts of justice to decline .. .,,169 A few years later,
the Attorney General, having recognized that "the law of nations ... [is]
a part of the law of the land" declared: "Congress may define those laws,
but cannot abrogate them ... laws of nations ... are of binding force
upon the departments and citizens of the Government.... Congress can-
not abrogate them or authorize their infraction. The Constitution does not
permit this Government" (i.e., the Executive) to do so either.7° Such rec-
ognitions had appeared also in an earlier opinion of the Attorney
General.
159. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792) (emphasis added).
160. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 88-89, 94-95, 120-21 n.55 & 139 n.96.
161. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dal].) 37 (1800).
162. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
163. Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 160 (Pa. 1792).
164. Id. at 162 (emphasis omitted).
165. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
166. Id. at 641-42 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
167. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 120-22 n.55, 139 n.96.
168. United States v. Darnaud, 25 F. Cas. 754 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1855).
169. Id. at 759-60.
170. See 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299-300 (1865).
171. It was recognized similarly that the law of nations "must be paramount to local law
in every question where local laws are in conflict" and that "[w]hat you [the President] will do
must of course depend upon the law of our own country, as controlled and modified by the law
of nations." 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 362-63 (1859).
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Importantly, the independent power and responsibility of the federal
judiciary to identify and apply customary international law was well-
recognized by the Founders and in early opinions and decisions, several
court opinions using the terms "bound" or "duty."'' This trend in expec-
tation is evident throughout our history and continues.' 73 Thus, it is not a
violation of the separation of powers for the courts to apply international
law. On the contrary, it would be seriously thwarting of the balance and
separation of powers not to do so in cases otherwise properly before the
courts.
174 In this sense, application of customary international law in The
Paquete Habana against favored and admitted Executive acts taken
abroad against aliens in time of war, at the height of Executive power
and discretion, was supportive of a proper balance and separation of
powers, since the Court identified and applied law to a case otherwise
properly before it. 7 1 It is also appropriate for the courts, and they have
done so from time to time, to use customary international law as an aid
for purposes of interpreting constitutional rights, duties, powers, and
competencies. 76 From the above, the suggestion that courts should step




The Founders, the text and structure of the Constitution, and the
overwhelming patterns of legal expectation since the dawn of the United
States support trends in judicial decision using customary international
law as law of the United States. Human rights, of fundamental impor-
tance to the Founders and the preferred consequences of democracy, are
reflected in long-term and widespread patterns of judicial use that, in
comparison to new and radical theories scantily dressed in supposed
historic veils, are thunderous in their affirmation of the competence and
responsibility of the judiciary to identify, clarify, and apply customary
172. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 7-8, 34-36 ns.37-38, 38-39 n.41, 40-41 n.44 &
47 n.56; see supra notes 1-2, 6, 15 & 31.
173. Id. at 7-8, 34-35 nn.37-38 & 46-48 nn.53-55 & 57.
174. See also PAuST, supra note 1, at 8-9, 76 n.101, 144-53, 198-203, 367, 382 n.34 &
474 nn.1 1-12; see supra notes 92-93.
175. See supra note 83. Even Justice Sutherland recognized in Curtiss-Wright (the case
famously loaded with far-reaching foreign affairs dicta) that there are two profoundly compel-
ling limits to foreign relations powers: "operations of the nation in ... ["foreign"] territory must
be governed by treaties... and the principles of international law." United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (emphasis added).
176. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 5-7, 34-40, 95, 174-75, 179, 186, 192-95, 221-
22 nn.92-93, 248, 338-45 & 371; Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 503 & n.120.
177. But see Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 27, at 525-26, 530.
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international law. As our first Chief Justice rightly affirmed, the custom-
ary law of nations is part of the law of the United States, even with
respect to private duties.' Later, Chief Justice Marshall assured that our
courts "are established.., to decide on human rights."'79
The new theoretic strategies are not merely antithetical to the expec-
tations and strivings of the Founders, the policy-structure of our
Constitution, and our rich history, but are also antithetical to our future in
an increasingly interdependent world and the demands of countless souls
for a measure of human dignity and effective human rights. God grant
that our courts not abandon customary human rights.' °
178. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Concerning private duties under customary
international law, see, for example, PAUST, supra note 1, at 7-8, 34, 43-45, 50, 182, 201-05,
207-10, 228, 264-70, 274-76 & 289-91; Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private
Duties under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. H.R. J. 51 (1992).
179. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810).
180. See also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119 (1864) (Davis, J.) ("By the
protection of the law human rights are secured; withdraw that protection, and they are at the
mercy of wicked rulers .... ).
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